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Entry, Cream Skimming, and Competition:







After privatizing local exchange companies (LEX), many countries are introducing
competition in local telephony in order to encourage both allocative and productive
efficiency. However, enormous sunk costs, and scale, scope and network economies
cannot guarantee perfect competition. This paper shows that depending upon
characteristics of the market – such as market structure or demand – competition may be
complete, partial, or even nonexistent. We use a game theoretical three-step model in
which an entrant firm cream skims the market. We illustrate our results by using
consistent Chilean data, and the model predicts that Chile’s local telephony market will
not become a deeply competitive market. This result is robust to changes in the model, in
particular to price cap regulation. This model provides us with two interesting economic
policy conclusions. First, cream skimming makes more profitable the entrance in the
market, but this practice reduces the possibility of full competition in the market. Second,
Santiago’s local telephony market should not be fully liberalized in the near future and
prices of the dominant firm should still be regulated.
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I. Introduction
After privatizing their local exchange companies (LEX), many countries are introducing
competition in this market of the telecommunication industry. With such a policy, governments
attempt both to improve productive efficiency and curb monopolistic rents in the market. Hence,
competition is view as a better instrument than regulation to achieve both goals.
However, the policy of enhancing competition does not ensure neither productive nor allocative
efficiency because this market is not competitive by definition. Enormous sunk costs after
building the network, as long as scale, scope, and network economies in the operation of the
facility make socially desirable to have a (natural) monopoly operating the market. Therefore,
new entrants have very narrow opportunities to gain market share and just liberalizing the
market does not ensure the development of competition.
As a consequence, the process of strengthening competition as not finished yet in those
countries that opened the local telephony market to new entrants in the last 15 years. Still old
monopolies dominate most of their markets. In the interim, new entrants are still in expansion
with coverage that certainly we may hardly consider them as “competitive” (Newbery, 2000).
This paper shows that it is possible to introduce competition in local telephony. However, this
market will not be perfectly competitive, except if new entrants using new technologies are able
to operate to substantial lower costs than the incumbent’s. In other words, leaving aside
technological shocks with asymmetric innovations – issue that we do not attempt to assess here
– new LEXs will partially enter in the market. That is, new entrants would build its own
network but with partial coverage.
According to recent literature on (telecommunications) network competition (e.g. Laffont, Rey,
and Tirole, 1998; Laffont and Tirole, 2000; Armstrong, 2001) we ought to observe the
following market behavior: given an incumbent firm with market power and imperfect
regulation, equilibrium prices will be above marginal costs. Then, a new entrant has market
power on the residual demand and so it will enter in the market charging some price in between
its marginal costs and the incumbent’s price. However, the higher the new entrant’s coverage
the lower the incumbent’s market power, so the more difficult the entry in the market. This
literature, in particular Laffont, et. al, does not specify the final outcome of the competition
process. They assume that the new entrant builds its own network with full coverage.
The theoretical importance of this paper to this literature is to model post-entry competition. We
assume that the new entrant’s decision about whether or not to enter in the market is
endogenous. We also assume that the new entrant has the strategy to cream skim the market.
That is, this LEX may choose to cover only to the more profitable customers, such as big
enterprises, richer neighborhoods, or business buildings, whose high level demands allow the
new entrant a fast recovering of its investments. With such a policy, a new entrant leaves those
less profitable customers to the incumbent firm (who has mandatory full coverage in all
markets). Doing so, new entrant’s cream skimming negatively modifies the outcome of the post-
entry competitive process in local telephony.
Whether new entrants extensively use this strategy is a matter of fact. However, new entrant’s
cream skimming is fully consistent with practice in Chile.ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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The importance of assessing post-entry competition assuming cream skimming is that if new
entrants extensively use such a practice, then competition will not be deep enough. The
incumbent would still have market power to obtain monopolistic rents and final prices would be
inefficient. In such unpleasant scenario, market competition in local telephony will not perform
a good as a regulatory agency, making the society worse off with this liberalization process.
1
Our theoretical approach to this topic is by using a perfect and full information three-step game.
We assume that all customers hire local telephony only from two firms, for any given set of
prices. This model attempts to characterize network competition and provide some economic
policy conclusions based on such goal. It does not pretend to answer other related questions,
such as performance of pricing regulation, welfare impacts of competition in
telecommunications, optimal pricing in this sector, and so on. All of these other issues are rather
than conveniently treated in the already mentioned literature.
Since it is impossible to obtain close solutions for our model, we solve it using both some
algebraic analysis and, mainly numerical simulations. For simulations, we use data from
Santiago de Chile’s local telephony market from 1999.
The model has some simplifications that fortunately are without loss of generality. For instance,
we assume a constant and inelastic demand. The latter is consistent with empirical evidence in
other countries, where several authors have found very small elasticities for local telephony.
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The more important economic policy conclusions of this paper is that in most cases new
entrants will not build its own network with full coverage. This conclusion is true whether or
not the new entrant cream skim the market. Therefore, a total liberalization of the local
exchange market will hardly produce the benefits to the society that some people tell about this
type of policy. As a consequence, introducing competition in local telephony is not a sufficient
mechanism to guarantee and efficient performance of the market.
Additionally, although cream skimming is not the only responsible for this outcome, this new
entrant’s strategy is inefficient because it increases equilibrium prices above those in which this
strategy is not feasible. This conclusion is relevant since new entrant’s cream skimming is
common and it is not legally forbidden in most countries.
In the extension of the model we assume that regulatory fixed price caps are binding. We show
that our main conclusions – about post entry competition – does not change after introducing
this extension.
This paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section II; in particular, we describe
assumptions and notation, we explain the functioning of the model, and we present its
parameterization. In section III we solve the benchmark. In section IV we show theoretical and
numerical results for the market cream-skimming scenario. Section V presents the extension
with a binding price cap. Finally, section VI concludes.
                                               
1 We ruled out the case of extremely inefficient regulation. Definetively, this is a good assumption
considering the Chilean case.
2 For example, see Mitchell (1978) or Park, Wetzel, and Mitchell (1983). Both articles estimated price-
elasticities on around 0.1.ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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II. The Model
II.1 Assumptions and Notation
We model the competition process as a three-step sequential game. There are two players:
player 1 is the incumbent firm that has full coverage of the market, and player 2 is the new
entrant, which in turn have to choose about its market coverage. Regulators have a passive role
in this model.
In the first step firm 2 chooses is coverage, denoted by m. We suppose that the new entrant
immediately builds its facilities related to such coverage, with a cost of d(m). This coverage is
common knowledge. In the second step both firms compete “à la Bertrand”, choosing what
prices they will charge for their services (p1, p2).
3 Networks are imperfect substitutes, thus
equilibrium prices may differ and they are above marginal costs. Finally, in the third step
customers observe prices and then they make two decisions: to what network subscribe –
denoted by a(p1,p2) – and how much to use the service – i.e. their demand q(p1,p2) –. Section
II.2 describes in detail each step of this game.
The structure of this game is similar to that of Laffont et.al. (LRT), so that we name this case as
the benchmark. Additionally, we allow the new entrant to cream skim the market, that is firm 2
chooses its customers according the level of their demand. We suppose that customers can be of
two types: high level demand or low level demand.
Payoff functions have the traditional structure, except by access charges needed for interconnect
both telecomm networks. It is important to mention that when two or more networks are
interconnected, calling can be classified in “on-net” – a call starts and finishes in the same
network – and “off-net” – a call starts and finishes in different networks–. Since we do not
attempt to assess optimal access charges, we just suppose a standard assumption on the
literature, Balanced Calling Pattern. This assumption means that the percentage of “on-net”
calls is equal to the percentage of customers belonging to such network. It implies that the flow
of calls, in term of minutes, becomes balanced.
We assume that the regulator exogenously fixes both access charges and interconnection
charges in a level that they do not impede the entry of the new entrant. Moreover, we suppose
that access charges are symmetric.
Demand functions are q(pi), in which pi denotes firm’s i price. So that, once a customer chooses
a network her demand only depend on the price of such firm, not on the rival’s. In the case of
cream skimming, demand functions are ql(pi) for low level demand customers and qh(pi) for
high-level demand customers.
The next table summarizes notation that we uses in this paper:
                                               
3 We assume that each pi is a single price, not a vector of prices. These firms produce one good and they
charge the same unit price at any time. That is, we do not allow for peak load pricing in our model. This
assumption is without loss of generality.ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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pi Firm i’s profit function
l, h Percentage of low, high demand customer (l + h = 1)
q(pi) Demand function when new entrant does not cream skim the market
ql(pi), qh(pi) Demand functions with market cream skimming
p1, p2 Incumbent and new entrant’s prices
X Constant level demand without market cream skimming
X, Y Constant level demands with market cream skimming for low and high level demands,
respectively
f Unit fixed cost (by customer or line)
c Marginal Cost (by minute)
t Transportation cost by customer
a – c0 Net access charge (access charge minus interconnection cost between networks), by minute
m New entrant’s coverage without cream skimming
ml ,mh New entrant’s coverage in low and high level markets, respectively
a(p1,p2) Ratio of customers in network 1 covered by both networks. If a=0 all customers are in firm
2; if a=1 all customers are in firm 1.
a1(p1,p2), a
2(p1,p2)
Percentage of customers in networks 1 and 2, respectively. These values depend upon a( )
and new entrants market coverage
al(p), ah(p) Similar to a( ), but now for type of customer
Note: subscript i = 1,2 denotes firms 1 (incumbent) and 2 (entrant).
II.2 MODEL’S DESCRIPTION
Let us now describe in details each stage of the game. Let us do it backward in order to be
consistent with the resolution of the game.
Third Step
Taking as given prices and new entrant’s coverage, customers choose in this steps how much
minutes of telecom services consume and what company will provide them the service for.
Demand function determines the usage of the service, which only depends on the price charged
by the firm and not by its rival’s. Similarly, if the new entrant is cream skimming the market
each type of customer will make calls based on her pertinent demand, ql(pi) or qh(pi), in which
ql(pi) < qh(pi).
We solve the company’s choice by using a Hotelling model for imperfect substitute goods.
Doing so, we are capturing the diversity of service characteristics provided by a LEX – such as
quality of the telecommunication service itself, customer services, tastes, marketing, etc. –. We
suppose that customers are uniformly distributed over a straight line. Each consumer’s location
is given by function a(p1,p2), which may take any value in the interval [0,1]. Firms are located
in each extreme of the straight line, firm 1 (incumbent) is located in the extreme left (a = 0) and
the new entrant is located in the extreme right of this line (a = 1).ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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The further each consumer is located from its company, the higher transportation costs (t) that
she has to pay. Therefore, this transportation cost is the variable that determines the degree of
substitution between companies. Each consumer chooses a LEX that produce her higher
benefits, function which is in turn decreasing on prices and transportation costs.
4
At equilibrium, each customer is indifferent between networks because both of them with the
same net utility. Let the consumer’s indirect utility function be v(p). Then, we have:
) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 a a - - = - t p v t p v (II.1)
Solving for a, we obtain a function that allocates customers between networks according to
prices and transportation costs:





) , ( 2 1 2 1 p v p v
t
p p - + = a (II.2)
Since a ˛ [0,1], then a = 0 implies none consumer is an incumbent’s customer, whereas the
contrary happens when a = 1. When both networks charge similar prices the second expression
of II.2 vanishes, thus a = 0.5.
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By the envelope theorem, we can obtain de demand function from the indirect utility function.
The converse is also true, thus:
v p q p
p
( ) ( ) = -￿
0
(II.3)
In the case that the demand is a constant, independently of price, v(p) = – pX, where X is the
number of minutes in which a customer uses the local telephony service. In such a case II.2
becomes:
( ) ( ) a p p
X
t
p p 1 2 2 1
1
2 2
, = + - (II.4)
Second Step
In the second stage of the model, firms take new entrant’s coverage as given. Then, they
unilaterally choose their prices in order to maximize profits. Let us assume that the incumbent’s
equilibrium price is not higher than the regulated price. Since this assumption may change
conclusions, we take account of it lately.
                                               
4 We insist in saying that t is an abstraction, which represents different LEXs’ attributes. The higher t, the
lower substitutability between networks.
5 We know that the indirect utility function also depends on the individual’s income. We are implicitly
assuming here that all customers consume only one good, telecommunication services. This assumption
is obviously without loss of generality.ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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‘Benchmark’ Scenario
In the case in that the new entrant cannot cream skim the market, both firms maximize the
following profit function:
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) p a a a a i i j i i j i i j j p p p c a c q p f a c q p ( , ) ( ) ( ) = · - - · - · - + · · - · 0 0   (II.5)
where a1 = a1(p1,p2) and a1 = a2(p1,p2) respectively represent the percentage of incumbent and
new entrant’s customers. By definition, these expressions are function of a(p1,p2) and m, where
the latter corresponds to the new entrant’s coverage. Then,
( ) ( ) ( ) a m a 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 p p p p , , = - · -
( ) ( ) ( ) a m a 2 1 2 1 2 1 p p p p , , = · -
The first term of expression II.5 represents firm i’s profit when its customers use its network,
network which has ai of the whole market. Net benefits per customer have variable and fix
term. The variable term includes mark-up times demand minus payments to the other firm in
term of net access charges. The fix term per customer (f) includes technical and commercial
support, marketing, etc.
The second term of expression II.5 corresponds to firm i’s interconnection earnings when firm
j’s customers make off-net calls. Our calling balanced pattern assumption yields:
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] p a a a i i j i i i i j j i p p p c q p f a c q p q p ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = · - · - + · · - · - 0 (II.5’)
Notice that if q(pj) = q(pi) then the last term of II.5’ vanishes because the flow of calls cancels.
This characteristic of the profit function is in extreme useful. A sufficient condition to fulfill it is
that both firms confront infinitely inelastic demands.
Next figure shows the functioning of the model in the benchmark scenery.
Unique Market
a = 0 a = 1 Demand q(p1,p2)
‘Market Cream Skimming’ Scenario
As previously mentioned, this scenario assumes two types of customers, those with high level
demand (h) and those with low level demand (l). Subscripts h and l mean that the precedent
variable corresponds to one of them. Similarly, variables h and l indicate the ratio of these
customers in the market. Hence, firm i chooses pi in order to maximize the following profit
function:ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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Regarding the benchmark, it is possible to remark some changes. First, new entrant has two
market coverage, one for the low demand consumers (ml) and the other form high demand
consumers (mh). New entrant chooses both, ml and mh, at the first stage. Therefore, total market
shares of both firms (a1 and a2) are weighted averages of their participation in each market’s.
Next figure summarizes firm’s pricing decision in this scenery. We represent new entrant’s






Low Demand ql(p) l
Firm 2
First Step
In the first stage of the model, new entrant strategically chooses its coverage in order to
maximize profits. The number of coverage depends upon the number of types of customers that
we assume in the market. In the benchmark we have only one type of customer, so that firm 2
just chooses m, but in the case of cream skimming this firm chooses a different coverage for
each type of customer.
In addition, to bid a telecomm network implies an important fixed cost for new comers. We
represent such a cost by the expression d(m). By simplicity, we will ignore this cost when doingENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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numerical simulations, which in turn only has quantitative impact on our conclusions. Anyway,
at the end of the paper we perform some simulations to show that ignoring d(m) is innocuous.
6
New entrant chooses its coverage in order to maximize:
‘Benchmark’ Scenario: ( ) ( ) ( ) Max p p d
m p m m 2 1 2 , -
‘Cream Skimming’ Scenario: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Max p p p p d
l h
l h l h m m p m m m m
, , , , , 2 1 2 1 2 -
II.3 PARAMETERIZATION OF THE MODEL
As having mentioned in the introduction, we suppose that the demand of the consumers for
phone calls is constant and independent of the price. Nevertheless, this doesn't impede the
existence of more than a demand level, when the presence is supposed of more than client's
type.
The use of a constant demand doesn't only have as objective to facilitate the resolution of the
pattern, but rather it is also appropriate with some empiric evidence regarding the elasticity
price of the demand for local phone service. The article by Park et. al (1983) estimates the
elasticity of the demand for local phone calls, with simulated data for the state of Illinois, USA.
Although the elasticities estimated by them are significantly different from zero, these take
reduced values that are around 0.1 (in absolute value). It is also important to mention the work
of Mitchell (1978), in which is considered the change in number of carried out calls when
he/she spends of a system of fixed price (“flat rate”) to a collection for carried out call
(“metered service”). In this case, the obtained elasticity takes values that they are growing in the
charged fixed rate and in the change in unit costs. When one of those two rates is reduced, the
elasticity is near at 0. Mitchell also mentions the results obtained by Turner for the United
Kingdom
7, who obtained elasticities smaller price at 0.1, in absolute value, for residential and
entrepreneurial customers.
Nonetheless, the empiric evidence is not unanimous regarding the values of the elasticity of the
demand. For example, Train et. al (1987) find elasticities price around 0.45 for the demand of
local telephony. We should take into account that these results are not directly applicable to our
model, since that article allows the substitutability among services of fixed rate and services of
rate variable that it is a non available option for the fixed telephony in the Chilean case. Finally,
Abdala et. al (1996) consider elasticities based on data for Argentina. Using alternatives
                                               
6 To assume d(m) = 0 is an upper bound for competition. It is equivalent to assume unbundling entry in
which the fixed cost of building the network (f) can be considered as the lease of the incumbent’s
network. This situation is perhaps the ideal for many regulators (see the discussion in Laffont and
Tirole, 2000, Chapter 5), however our model predicts that even assuming this the market will probably
not become fully competitive.
7 Turner, W.M. (1975). CEPT Study of the Growth of the Telephone Service, Reported by the United
Kingdom, Telecommunications Headquarters Marketing Dept., British Post Office, London.ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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econometric techniques, the authors find a wide range of elasticities for different cities, although
in general these are not as low as estimated by Park et.al. (1983). In summary, although the
evidence is not conclusive in this respect, the present document assumes that a constant demand
is enough to represent the local phone market, at least for small variations of price.
It is important to mention that the elasticity mentioned in the previous paragraphs refers to the
average variation in minutes consumed when the price of the service changes. Therefore, this
elasticity is not related with the demand substitution among “normal schedule” and “reduced
schedule” in the face of changes in the charged rates.
Since the number of consumed minutes doesn't respond to variations in prices, we should expect
that the “action” in this model comes from the election of the clients regarding the signature to
the firm which to belong, denoted by a(p1,p2). As it will be seen later on, this variable is
decisive in the determination of the new entrant’s optimal coverage.
Under the supposition “balanced calling patterns”, the constant demand implies that both firms
have an identical flow of calls “off-net.” In consequence, the term corresponding to the
interconnection cost among signatures disappears of the profit functions of both firms. In
presence of “cream skimming” two different demand levels exist, so that the interconnection
cost doesn't disappear in this case.
It is also necessary to point out that the second stage of the game presents multiple Nash
equilibria for certain covering ranges. In the case that this happens, we use the minimum of
those prices. It is preferred low prices because these they adapt better to the supposition that no
client is excluded of the phone service.
The data were obtained starting from available information in the Subsecretaría de
Telecomunicaciones de Chile (Subtel). We calibrate parameters in order to make them
compatible with the format of the variables in our model. Thus, for example, the prices used in
the model differ of actual prices of the local phone service in Chile. This happens for basically
theree reasons. On the one hand, Chilean telecommunications regulation considers a kind of
peak load pricing (normal and reduced hours). Since the model doesn't incorporate such a tariff
schedule, the price that we use corresponds to a simple average of Chilean prices. On the other
hand, the price for the service consists of a two-part tariff, a monthly fixed element and one
variable per minute. Since our model doesn’t have a fixed charge, we transform the monthly
fixed charge for line in a variable charge per minute by dividing the former for the consumption
average of minutes for phone line. Finally, in order to use consistent data we use that from
Santiago de Chile, the capital city.
For October of 1999, the maximum prices fixed by Subtel to the Company of
Telecommunications of Chile (CTC), for concept of Measured Local Service (SLM),
correspond at 16.17 Ch$/minute in normal hours and 2.70 Ch$/minute in reduced hours. This
implies on the average a maximum price of 9.43 Ch$/minute. When adding the maximum fixed
charge, the (maximum) regulated price consistent with the model is about 16.2 Ch$/minute.
The cost of transport (t) it is not an observable variable, since it corresponds to an abstraction to
allow imperfect substitutability among networks. To obtain a value of t, we assume that the
price average that would be reached in the event of a complete entrance on the part of the new
firm is of 12 Ch$/minute, under the benchmark. Supposing that the fixed component of the price
is similar to the effective one at the moment, the variable part of the price is equal to 5.3ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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Ch$/minute. In turn, according to the observed relationship of normal and reduced prices, that
value is equivalent to a SLM of 9.0 Ch$/minute in normal hours and of 1.5 Ch$/minute in
reduced hours. Our best justification for the election of that price is that it is difficult to suppose
that competition will reduce prices lower to those mentioned above. Therefore, cost of transport
generated by means of this mechanism corresponds to t = 1,248 Ch$/line/month.
The following chart summarizes the values used in the numeric simulations:
“Benchmark” Scenario
c = 3.7 Ch$/min
f = 5,185 Ch$/line/month
t = 1248 Ch$/line/month
X (total) = 775 Min/line/month
 “Cream Skimming” Scenario
c, f, t = Same as “benchmark”
X (low level) = 600 Min/line/month
Y (high level) = 1,300 Min/line/month
l = 0.75
h = 0.25
a - c0 = 2.2 Ch$/min
III. Resolution and Simulation of the Benchmark
First of all, we find algebraic expressions for the balance prices, maximizing – without
































For reasons that we will discuss later on, these functions are only valid when coverage is higher
than 40% (m > 0.4) and the incumbent’s price is inferior to the regulated maximum price, that is
(p1 <p1_reg). We can observe that both prices are growing in marginal cost (c), fixed cost (f), and
cost of transport (t), and decreasing in coverage (m) and demand size (X). Additionally, for
smaller coverage than 100%, p1 > p2; but when m = 1, p1 = p2.
The behavior of the model depends on important way of the function a(p1,p2); that is to say, in
the way in which customers choose the firm to the one which to subscribe. When replacing










= p p (III.2)
This expression presents two interesting characteristics. In the first place, we observe that a( )
is independent of cost parameters (c, f, t) and the demand (X). Therefore, the consumer's choice
between firms is exclusively due to new entrant's coverage. Likewise, the difference between p1
and p2 only depends on the same coverage.ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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 In second place, the equation written previously holds with a ‡ 0 only if m ‡ 0.4. Therefore, a
customer covered for both firms will decide to continue into the incumbent only when the new
entrant's coverage exceeds 40% of the market. This result is remarkable because it takes place
independently of the costs facing by the two firms, the level of the demand level, or the degree
of substitutability between networks.
With coverage smaller than 40%, unconstrained maximization problems of the two firms in the
second stage of the game would generate negative values for a( ). This is because the lower m,
the higher the difference between prices. As a matter of fact, it is possible that we arrive to the
point in which the difference between p1 and p2 is as high as so that a( ) takes negative values.
Since this is not allowed, we carried out a constrained maximization whose result is a(p1,p2) = 0
for any coverage m £ 0.4. This result produces infinite Nash equilibria. Just as it was pointed
out in the previous section, we choose the minimum price of them.
Since p1 is decreasing in m and that p1 is constant for any coverage similar or smaller than 40%,
the superior bound for that price is the lowest value that fulfill with a( ) = 0 (supposing that new
entrant optimally chooses p2). That price is determined by the equation IV.1, for m = 0.4.
Therefore, the highest price that the incumbent sets is given by p1_sup = c + (1/X)*(f + 3*t). This
value (15.22 Ch$/minute for the used data) is useful because it allows us to determine when the
regulatory cap will become active. We assess this issue later in this paper.
Figure III.1 shows how the function a(p1,p2) changes according to the incumbent's coverage, for
different caps on the regulated price (p1_reg). At the moment, we will concentrate on the case in
which this cap is not active (p1_reg ‡ p1_sup or “p1_reg = no” in the graph). We will see in a section
ahead the case in which this restriction becomes active (p1_reg < p1_sup).
Figure III.1










































p1_reg = no p1_reg =14 p1_reg =11.5
Just as it was explained in the previous paragraphs, while m £ 0.4 all consumers covered for the
new entrant choose to be its customers. On the other hand, coverage above 40% makes that
more and more customers prefer to stay in the incumbent’s network. This result is due to that
firm 1 reacts after firm 2 enter by reducing prices, so becoming the incumbent more andENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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more attractive. When the entrance of firm 2 is total, perfect competition is reached. In such a
case, each firm would have half of the market (a = 0.5) and both firms charge the same prices.
Prices charged by both firms have a similar pattern to the one of a( ), as we may observe in the
figure of below. Both p1 and p2 stay fixed when m £ 0.4. As this coverage increases, not only
prices decreases, but the difference between p1 and p2 also decreases (for each level of m).
Eventually, both prices converge at m = 1.
Figure III.2
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p1_reg = no p1_reg =14 p1_reg =11.5
Through the Figure III.3 it is possible to observe what it happens to the new entrant's profit as
its coverage increases. It can be observed its profits strictly increasing in m provided the prices
remain constant; that is to say, for any coverage smaller than 40%. For firm 2's coverage above
40%, higher m implies smaller profits for this firm.
Figure III.3


































p1_reg = no p1_reg =14 p1_reg =11.5
Therefore, optimal coverage for the new entrant is the highest possible for the one which a( )
remains constant. When the regulatory restriction on the price p1 is not active, thatENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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optimal coverage is always 0.4. Since new entrant's profits are strictly increasing on m when a( )
= 0, it is impossible that m is smaller than 40%. Additionally, any not binding constraint (p1_reg >
p1_sup) will always generate the same result in both equilibrium prices and new entrant’s
coverage (in the previous picture, curves for any value of p1_reg > 15.22 will be exactly the same
ones).
IV. Resolution and Simulation of the “Market Cream
Skimming” Scenario
Without taking into account incumbent’s market discrimination, the regulation on the maximum
price neither interconnection costs, equilibrium prices at the second stage – given ah > 0 –
correspond to the following expressions:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ]
p c
lX hY
lX hY f t t lX hY
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(IV.1)
Both functions are always increasing on the marginal cost (c), fixed cost (f), and the cost of
transport (t). Regarding new entrant’s coverage in the high demand market (mh), both prices
have positive derivatives, whereas they are ambiguous with respect to the coverage in the other
market (ml).
8 The equations IV.1 were obtained starting from unconstrained maximization
problems, for what the same warnings are applied that for the “benchmark” scenario.
Combinations of prices that imply ah(p1,p2) < 0 become in ah(p1,p2) = 0, using the lowest prices
that are part of Nash equilibria.
Consumer’s Choice of the Firm which to belong
In a similar way to the “benchmark” scenario, we can analyze how the model works starting
from the form in which customers choose the firm to the one which to belong. In this case, the
expressions for ah(p1,p2) and al(p1,p2) coming from equations IV.1 are:
( ) ( ) ( )


































                                               
8 ¶p1/¶ml > 0 when mh > 4l, ¶p2/¶ml > 0 when mh > 2l; where l = [tX ( lX + hY )] / [hY ( Y - X ) ( 3f - t )].ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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It can be observed that none of the two functions depends on marginal cost, fixed cost, or cost
of transport (since the equations don't include variables c, f, or t). Rather, the choice of the
consumers regarding the network to which to belong is only determined by the size of the
demand, for the proportion of low and high demand customers, and for the coverage of the new
entrant in each market.
Since ml £ 1 and mh £ 1, the values that ah( ) and al( ) can take are between 0 and ½. The slope
of both functions is strictly increasing with regard to the coverage in each market. Also, it can
be noticed that the slope of ah is steeper than al’s because Y > X by definition. Since both
variables converge to the same value when ml = mh = 1, ah always takes inferior values to those
of al. This means that al > 0 for any combination of prices (p1,p2) such that ah = 0.
As we will see next, the maximum profit for firm 2 in this scenario is also determined in
function of the number of customers that choose to belong to it. However, since ah is the first
that reaches the inferior bound when m decreases, it is this variable the one that determines the
new entrant’s maximum profit. In conclusion, it is possible to forget al into the analysis from
now on. It could be said that this variable “imitates” the ah‘s behavior because both depend on
the same prices (p1,p2) and ah and al only differ for their slope.
Optimal Coverage
Figure IV.1 shows new entrant’s profit and the choice of the customers on the firm to which
they belong (ah), in function of the coverage in the market with high demand (mh) for a given
level of coverage in the residential (low demand) market. According to with that mentioned in
previous paragraphs, we can observe that the maximum profit of the new entrant is reached
when mh is the highest given ah = 0 (i.e. when all high demand customers who are covered by
the two networks belong to firm 2). It is necessary to point out that this characteristic is also
observed when the figure is carried out in function of the coverage in the market with lower
demand.
Figure IV.1
Firm 2’s Profit anda ah(p1,p2) , by coverage in the High Demand Market
m ml = 0 m ml = 1



























































































0.5ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
15
Starting from the same figure, we can conclude that the optimal coverage of the new entrant is
the highest possible such that it avoids its potential customers to become incumbent’s
customers, for any coverage in the other market. This observation allows us to obtain an
algebraic expression that determines the new entrant’s optimal coverage in any market as a
function of the coverage in the other market. Doing so, we work out with equations IV.2,





l hY lXY lXY lX
hY
=




Since we obtained equation IV.3 using expressions generated starting from an unconstrained
maximization problem, it is possible that IV.3 takes values outside of the range [0,1]. In such a
case, the new entrant’s optimal coverage has to take the values 1 or 0, depending on if the
unconstrained coverage is mh > 1 or mh < 0, respectively. Therefore, the correct mathematical
expression for this optimal coverage in the high demand market is:  max{min [(IV.3), 1], 0}.
As it can be observed in figure IV.1, there is an additional reason for which the expression IV.3
doesn’t always hold. The right section of that figure shows that it would be also possible an
optimal coverage of zero (mh = 0). That is to say, there are cases in which it is not optimal for
the new entrant to serve both markets. This is due to that the new entrant can find more
profitable to charge high prices and to increase the profitability for customer, instead of to
charge low prices and to maximize the number of subscribed customers. We develop this issue
with more detail in the section corresponding to regulated price caps.
Figure IV.2








































Y / X = 1.01 Y / X = 2.17 Y / X = 3 Y / X = 6
Based on the equation IV.3, Figure IV.2 shows combinations of mh and ml such that ah = 0; that
is to say, this figure shows the optimal combinations of coverage in both markets that maximize
new entrant’s profit. The curves correspond to different relative sizes among the high demand
market (Y) and the low demand market (X), maintaining constant the average demand (0.75 X +
0.25 Y = 775, according to the data).ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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A first characteristic of the mentioned figure is that the optimal coverage in a market is not
increasing in the coverage in the other market (¶mh / ¶ml £ 0). This is a general condition that is
not only apply for equation IV.3, but also when the optimal coverage is zero. Starting from this
result, we can infer that to monopolize both markets at the same time will not be an equilibrium
strategy for the new entrant in this model.
The slope of ¶mh/¶ml – that is to say, ¶
2mh/¶ml
2 – decreases as the size of the high demand market
increases with regard to the low demand market. In the next figure we observe that when the
quotient Y/X goes to infinite, ¶mh/¶ml goes to zero. In the limit, the optimal coverage is mh = 0.4
for any ml level, which is consistent with the benchmark (Y/X ﬁ ¥). In the limit case, when Y/X
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Figure IV.3 shows the new entrant’s profit as a function of its coverage in the lower demand
market, for different levels of relative demand. The left-hand side panel comes from equation
IV.3, while the right hand side panel corresponds to a numeric simulation. It is possible to
notice that both pictures differ basically in the curve corresponding to Y/X = 15. The divergence
between both pictures take place for the previously mentioned reason: the maximum profit is
obtained with mh = 0, although that value doesn't represent the highest coverage for the one
which ah(p1,p2) = 0. Given the evidence of the figure, it is reasonable to suppose that firm 2
won't act according to equation IV.3 in order to avoid losses, since when not entering in the
higher demand market it can charge much higher prices.
It is possible to observe that, except for very similar demand sizes among these two markets
(Y/X = 1.2), the solution takes place in limit values; that it to say, ml = 0 or 1. It is important to
also highlight that, as the quotient Y/X grows, profit function acquires a more and more steeper
slope, such that the optimal coverage for the low demand market spreads to be zero. In
conclusion, optimal coverage in this market spreads to be a solution of the type “all or nothing”.
Starting from equation IV.3, we can determine the “breaking point” for Y/X; that is to say, the
relationship among demands starting from which the optimal coverage ml moves from zero toENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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one. Replacing equation IV.3 in the new entrant’s profit function, we look for the condition that
fulfills p2(ml = 0) = p2(ml = 1). Given the non-linearity of the resulting expression, it is not
possible to find an explicit solution in terms of the demand sizes. However, we can obtain an
implicit condition in terms of the fixed cost divided by the cost of transport, f / t :
( ) f
t
X hY lXY lX
hY hXY lX Y lX
=
+ -
- - + 5
24 25
2 2 3 3
2 2
3 2 2 3 (IV.4)
Until here, our results are valid provided the new entrant’s coverage in the residential (low
demand) market is a corner solution. However, as Y/X decreases optimal ml can be interior, just
as it is observed in figures IV.2 and IV.3. In order to determine the value for the which the
optimal coverage takes a limit value, we look for an algebraic expression starting from the








For market sizes used in our numeric simulation, equation IV.5 gives us a value of Y/X » 2.12.
This result is coherent with that observed in the previous figures. This means that numerical
demands (X = 600, Y = 1300) are exactly in the limit so that the observed solution is a corner
one (since we use Y/X » 2.17).
In summary, we may characterize the behavior of the new entrant regarding the low demand
market in the following way: Either this firm will perfectly cream skim the market or fully enter
in both markets, whenever Y/X £ (3l / 2h)
0.5. For values which Y/X is higher than such a limit,
the new entrant partially cream skim the market (optimal ml is interior). Therefore, in order that
the optimal coverage in the low level demand market is zero (perfect cream skimming), it is
required that the left hand side of equation IV.4 be higher than the right hand side of such
equation. All these conclusions apply provided equation IV.3. In the case that this doesn't
happen, it will be optimal for the new entrant perfectly cream skim the market in a very strange
and counterintuitive fashion: its optimal coverage will be ml = 1 and mh = 0.
Using equation IV.3, we draw the relationship between the new entrant’s profit and the optimal
coverage in the high demand market (mh), for different levels of relative demand (Y/X). Such as
we may intuit from Figure IV.2, Figure IV.4 (next page) shows that the optimal coverage in the
high demand market is usually an interior solution. Only as Y/X goes to 1, mh goes to 0.
It can also be observed that the new entrant’s profit function presents two local maxima. For
higher values of Y/X, the local maximum that corresponds to a higher value of mh prevails. For
lower values of Y/X, this local maximum displaces down and right; the contrary happens to the
left local maximum. Therefore, increases in the relative size of the residential demand (X) may
make the left local maximum overcomes to the right local maximum (which happens when de
actual level of the demand in the residential market is higher than that implicitly determined by
equation IV.4). This means that, in exactly this point, the optimal coverage in the high demand
market jumps toward a smaller value.
In summary, we can describe the effects of a change in Y/X on the new entrant’s optimal
coverage in the high demand market as follows: as Y/X ﬁ ¥, ml ﬁ 0 y mh ﬁ 0.4. Then, weENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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obtain a situation of cream skimming with partial coverage. As the residential demand (X)
becomes higher, mh gradually increases and ml continues being zero. Arrived certain point, we
again obtain the counterintuitive result, that is ml = 1 and mh goes down drastically. Finally, if the
difference between demands spreads to disappear (Y/X ﬁ 1), optimal coverage in both markets
is any combination that generates an entrance to the market of 40%; that is, h · mh + l · ml = 0.4.
Figure IV.4
Firm 2’s profit for selected demand sizes
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Let us explain those results. For most of cases, we can say that post entry competition is
centered in the high demand (entrepreneurial) market. The low demand (residential) market is
completely ignored by the new entrant when the demand of this market is small because it is not
worthwhile to enter in a war of prices to attract those clients. However, if such demand is not so
small, the strategy of war of prices makes sufficiently profitable the entrance market such that
the new entrant fully enter in the residential. In such a case, the incumbent doesn't oppose
resistance because the most profitable customers continue being those of the entrepreneurial
market. But when the demand in the entrepreneurial sector is very low compared with the
residential one, then the new entrant prefers to compete for the second market, leaving aside to
the first one. That is the logic of the counterintuitive result.
Figure IV.5 (next page) shows the new entrant’s profit as a function of the coverage in both
markets, for selected relative demands. Regarding the coverage in the low demand market, we
can observe that optimal ml = 0 for relative small size of this market. The contrary happens for
high sizes of this market. Then, we can say that as the optimal coverage in the residential market
passes of being none to be absolute (it should not be forgotten that we have here corner
solutions for this market).
Regarding the covering in the entrepreneurial market (Y), as before we also observe two local
maxima for the profit function. An increase in the size of that market elevates the right
maximum point and diminishes the left maximum. Therefore, as h increases (or l diminishes),
firm 2 penetrates the entrepreneurial market in a more aggressive way. These results are
coherent with that found for changes in Y/X. We may concluded that a reduction in both, Y/XENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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and h/l makes more attractive post entry competition in the residential market.
Figure IV.5
Firm 2’s Profit with respect to m mh
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New Entrant’s Equilibrium Price
Before concluding with this section, it is interesting to verify how the price gotten paid by firm
2 behaves. An expression for p2(mh) is obtained by substituting equation IV.3 in equation IV.1.
We are only interested on the sign of ¶p2 / ¶mh because ml corresponds to its optimal value for
each mh. This sign is determined by the following condition:
( ) ¶ m
¶ m
if and only if
2 p
hY l h XY l h X Y lX
h
h
< + + + - - > 0 2 2 3 3 0
3 2 2 3 ( ) ( )
Since this condition is always true, the sign of the derivative is always negative. Therefore, a
higher coverage of the new entrant in the high demand market implies smaller final prices. This,
in turn, is coherent with that observed in the benchmark.
The behavior of p2 is interesting for an additional reason. If equation IV.3 doesn’t hold – i.e. the
maximum profit is not obtained with the highest coverage that fulfills ah = 0, but with mh = 0 –
it generates equilibrium prices considerably higher than those obtained when the mentioned
equation holds. This is due to that the lower mh, higher equilibrium prices and, for this reason,
the new entrant obtains higher profits. Therefore, we should hope that regulation of prices – that
we will analyze next - avoids that the new entrant’s coverage in the high demand market be
zero.
Summarizing the analysis carried out until here, the cream skimming scenario provide us with
the following results:
• It is sufficient with analyzing the choice taken by entrepreneurial customers
regarding the firm which to belong (ah) to characterize the new entrant’s profit
function.
• Optimal coverage in any market is always decreasing with respect to the optimalENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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coverage in the other market. Then, it is not likely that a new entrant obtains high
participation in both markets.
• Quite big residential markets make firms interested in provide it with their
telecomm services. However, for most of cases, post entry competition usually
develops in the entrepreneurial market, with corner solutions in the residential
market.
V. Extension: Price Caps Regulation 
9
Until here, the analysis has not paid attention to the case in which the price cap fixed by the
regulator is active; that is to say, p1_reg < p1_superior in our model. Let us recall to the reader that
we suppose that price regulation consists of a maximum price (cap) above which the incumbent
cannot charge for its services. Moreover, our new entrant firm is free to charge any price for its
services.
Price Caps in the Benchmark
Let us go back to Figure III.1. It shows that to impose a restriction on p1 is equivalent to fix a
minimum for a( ). As the new entrant’s coverage increases, a( ) remains constant in its
minimum value, provided that this value is not inferior to the one that would be obtained if the
incumbent’s price were unconstrained. Once arrived to the point in which a( ) without
regulation exceeds to a( ) with regulation, growths in m make both a( )’s behave in a similar
manner, so that a( ) = 0.5 when m = 1. Hence, full coverage means both firms have fifty percent
of the market.
This implies that since a( ) is increasing on m, the result of the regulatory constraint is to
prolong the coverage interval for which the customer’s choice remains constant. In conclusion,
since maximum profits are obtained with the highest coverage for which a( ) remains constant,
the implication of an active regulation over prices is to increase the new entrant’s optimal
coverage (see Figure III.3 for an illustration of this result).
It is also possible that tariff regulation be too much “restrictive”. In an extreme case, the
regulator would fix cap price lower to which had been reached under perfect competition (i.e.
when m = 1). In this case – corresponding to the curve p1_reg = 11.5 in all section III’s figures –
we observe a change in the behavior of the equilibrium prices. The incumbent will charge the
maximum price (p1 = p1_reg) for any value of m. Firm 2 will charge a higher price to that of the
firm 1, so that a(p1,p2) > 0.5. In this case, the new entrant’s profits are always growing in m, so
that its optimal coverage becomes 100%. Notice that our model with differentiated goods allows
the entrant firm to charge higher prices than the regulated one.
                                               
9 We also performed two other extensions. One assumes that the incumbent discriminates in prices among
markets. The second one assesses the effects of considering alternative interconnection costs between
firms. However, we don’t present these extensions because their results are still preliminary and both
assumptions are further of the cream skimming issue that is the focus of this paper.ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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Let us provides the intuition behind these results. The incumbent has an established schedule of
prices for each new entrant's coverage. The incumbent begins to reduce its optimal price starting
from certain level of m. When the regulator fixes a lower cap than the optimal unconstrained
price, firm 1 continues maintaining its schedule of prices and coverage, i.e. its reduction of
prices only begins starting from the point in which its optimal price without regulation is
smaller than that regulated. Only when firm 1 begins to reduce prices, some customers will
choose to remain in that company, only after that firm 2’s profit will be falling in m. Therefore,
the lower p1_reg , the higher the optimal coverage of the new entrant.
As a summary of the benchmark with price cap regulation, let us say that the use of a constant
demand implies that all the “action” of the model is given by the incumbent’s market share, a().
The optimal coverage of the new entrant is the highest value for which a( ) remains constant.
Additionally, the only variable that can affect the behavior of a( ) – and hence the optimal
coverage of the new entrant –  is the incumbent’s maximum price fixed by the regulator.
Changes in c, f, t or X only affect equilibrium prices.
Price Caps with Cream Skimming
Lets know see how regulation on prices changes the results for the cream skimming scenario. In
particular, we are interested on both the incumbent’s market share in the high demand market
and on new entrant’s optimal coverage in both markets.
Figure V.1 shows the trajectories of the incumbent’s market share in the high demand market,
ah(p1,p2) for different levels of the regulated maximum price. Remember that this variable, ah(),
is crucial in the determination of the maximum profit for the new entrant. In such figure we
observe that an active regulation of prices make firm 2 charges higher prices than firm 1’s
(because ah takes values above 0.5). Furthermore, the higher cost of transport (t), the lower the
substitutability between networks and, therefore, the higher the maximum difference between p2
and p1.
Previously, we observed that the new entrant maximizes its profits as a function of the number
of customers that subscribed to it. Now, with binding regulation, we see that it is also possible
that this firm maximizes its profits through high prices, although that means fewer customers.
Despite Figure V.1 doesn't show the new entrant’s profit, it reaches its maximum point in the
coverage for which the function ah stops falling (to be more precise, it stops non-increasing).
Hence, this result is similar to the one observed for the benchmark, when regulated prices were
introduced.
Therefore, regulation of prices allows us to notice that the new entrant doesn't only maximize
profits when it monopolizes all the covered customers for both networks, but rather it can also
make it charging higher prices to those of the incumbent. Doing so, the new entrant may
considerably elevate its profitability by customer. This behavior is the same of the one that
explains equation IV.3 may not hold; when the coverage in a market is zero grow considerably.ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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Figure V.1
a ah(p1,p2) for alternative p1_reg
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Once analyzed the effect on equilibrium prices and optimal firm’s choice on the part of the
customers, let us see how a binding regulation of prices changes the optimal coverage in the low
demand (residential) market. Figure V.2 shows how new entrant’s profits varies according to its
market share in the residential market, for different regulated prices.
10
Figure V.2
Firm 2’s Profit for selected levels of p1_reg
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10 We draw this figure according to Chilean parameters: X = 600, Y = 1300, l = 75%, and h = 25%.ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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Regulation of prices can change the form and the position of the profit function of the firm 2. A
regulation a little “strict” – but still binding – is represented by the curve “p1_reg = 15”. Over
such a curve, we observe a slope change for high levels of ml, although in any case the optimal
coverage in this market continues being of 100%.
A little bit stricter regulation (p1_reg = 12) tends to reduce even more the slope of the profit
function, although it doesn’t necessarily changes its position. In this case, the new entrant’s
optimal coverage in the low demand market becomes zero. If the regulated price cap for the
incumbent is reduced even more, we observe a shift down of the profit function of firm 2 which,
in turn implies lower profits for the new entrant (it might even be negative).
In summary, the introduction of binding regulated prices may shift the new entrant’s profit
function. If the optimal ml = 1 with not binding regulation, then with binding but not such small
price cap this optimal coverage will continue being complete. However, even lower maximum
prices reduce profits for high coverage, then the solution may now be ml = 0. In general terms, if
the original solution was in a limit value, it will continue being so under stricter regulation of
prices of the dominant firm.
Figure V.3 shows what happens to the optimal coverage in the high demand market with a
binding regulation of prices. We observe that as the regulation of prices becomes stricter (that is
to say, as p1_reg diminishes), the new entrant’s profit function shift toward the right. Hence, the
regulation of prices increases the new entrant’s market share in the high demand market.
Figure V.3
Firm 2’s Profit for selected levels of p1_reg
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This behavior is quite intuitive. Prices that charge both firms are particularly sensitive to the
coverage of the newcomer in the high demand market. For this reason, in absence of regulation
of prices, it can be better to the new entrant not to enter aggressively to this market. Doing so,
firm 2 may increase its prices and profits by customer in the high demand market. If regulation
of prices is introduced, it is no longer possible to charge high prices. Then, it is better to attempt
to monopolize the cream of the market. However, as the regulator reduces the cap the newENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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entrant increases its coverage in this market resulting in a more likely “war of prices” by the
incumbent. Therefore, it should be noticed that regulation of prices doesn't only imply a wider
entrance to the entrepreneurial market, but also it means smaller profits for both firms.
VI. Preliminary Conclusions
Post entry competition in the local telephony market is a process that incorporates many
elements. A model that embraces all they probably generates nearer results to those observed in
the reality, but it will be useless. Our model belongs rather to a second group: although it is not
able to reproduce the exact situation of the local telephony in Santiago, it allows us to
understand the strategic behavior of firms participating in it. In this sense, seemingly restrictive
suppositions – as that of a constant demand – are not an obstacle to simulate a series of
interactions among firms and generate interesting economic policy results.
The more remarkable results that each scenario generates (assuming a binding regulation of
prices) – for the specific case of Santiago de Chile are the following ones:
• Benchmark scenario simulates a new entrant’s optimal coverage of 40%, for both
binding and not binding regulation. This result should not be interpreted as a normative
prediction, but as a reference value to be compared with the strategies analyzed in the
other scenario. The resulting prices in the benchmark are p1 = 15.22 and p2 = 13.61
(both measured in Chilean pesos by minute)
• According with our parameterization, the capacity of cream skim the market on the part
of new entrants produces a counterintuitive result: it is more convenient to a new entrant
to fully penetrate into the residential (low demand) market and not to enter into the
entrepreneurial (high demand) market. Doing so is more profitable for a new entrant
because in equilibrium it fixes higher prices that overcomes losses by not entering into
de high demand market. Moreover, new entrant’s optimal coverage is higher in
comparison with the benchmark, since 1 * 75% + 0 * 25% implies m = 0.75. Simulated
prices are p1 = 15.7 and p2 = 14.74.
Then, the most important difference between our simulations and the empiric evidence refers to
the prediction of an absolute entrance in the residential (low demand) market. This can be a
consequence of considering that a new entrant has negligible costs of installation. However, our
assumption is fully consistent with assuming network disintegration. If we think in those terms,
our model predicts that allowing potential new entrants don’t incur in the sunken cost of
building its own networks will not generate deep competition in local telephony. Then, this is an
important result because policy makers and academics are tempted to thinks the contrary, i.e.
network disintegration is “the” solution to lack of competition in this market. Unfortunately, this
is not necessarily true, as we have showed in this paper.
In conclusion, according to the analysis, our model seems to be pertinent to answer the initial
question, how post entry competition develops with and without cream skimming on the part of
the new entrant. It has been shown that the competition cannot fully develop. Only an extremely
strict regulation of prices is able to produce a total entrance of firm 2. However, this full entry
usually implies negative benefits for the incumbent. Hence, this strategy is politicallyENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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not viable because it means to take property rights away from the incumbent (besides negative
effects on investments, regulatory commitment, and other extremely important variables that
our model doesn’t analyze).
It can be inferred, then that network competition doesn’t generate the market results wanted by
the authorities at the moment to liberalize the market of local telephony. Although it is possible
that new firms partially enter, they cannot make it in an enough scale in order to generate fully
efficient equilibrium prices. To allow for a deeper competition in local telephony, it may be
necessary to implement incentives to enter, for example by initial subsidies, just as several
authors have mentioned (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994 and Vickers, 1995). On the
contrary, it is still impossible to trust on the free market competition as the institutional
arrangements that replace a regulatory agency in this market.ENTRY, CREAM SKIMMING, AND COMPETITION MANCERO AND SAAVEDRA
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